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BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
of the Code and concluded that title would not pass until the seller completed
physical delivery of the goods.
G.F.P.
WICKHAM V. LEVINE
261 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Sup. Ct. 1965)
Annotated under Section 2-106, supra.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-104. Form of Negotiable Instruments; "Draft";
"Check"; "Certificate of Deposit"; "Note"
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-104, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 90 (1964).
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in finding that the plaintiff
was a "holder in due course" under Section 3-302, had stated that "the stand-
ard of notice contemplated under ... § 3-302(1) (c) is actual notice and not
merely reasonable grounds for belief." 1964 Mass. Adv. Sh. 367, 372, 196
N.E.2d 847, 851-52. Subsequent to the report of this case, the court modified
its opinion, 347 Mass. 119, 125 (1964), adopting the view that "notice" as
used in Section 3-302 does not mean "actual knowledge." Under Section
1-201(25), "a person has 'notice' . . when . . . from all the facts and
circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know
that it exists." The court, however, did not reverse its finding that the
plaintiff was a "holder in due course" because "there was nothing in this
evidence by which the plaintiff had 'reason to know' of any fraud." Compare,
Annotation, 6 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 90, 92 comment 3 (1964).
SECTION 3-106. Sum Certain
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-104, supra.
SECTION 3-118. Ambiguous Terms and Rules of Construction
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-104, supra.
SECTION 3-302. Holder in Due Course
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-104, supra.
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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ANNOTATIONS
SECTION 3-307. Burden of Establishing Signatures, Defenses
and Due Course
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
196 N.E.2d 847 (Mass. 1964)
Annotated under Section 3-104, supra.
ARTICLE 4: BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
SECTION 4-202. Responsibility for Collection; When Action
Seasonable
HYDROCARBON PROCESSING CORP. V. CHEMICAL BANK N.Y. TRUST CO.
209 N.E.2d 806, 262 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1965)
The defendant, a commercial bank, extended loans totaling $750,000 to
Cuban Electric Corp., a Florida company operating in Cuba. These loans
matured in September 1958. In September 1959 the plaintiff deposited a sight
draft in the amount of $2,500 with the defendant for collection from the
plaintiff's debtor-vendee in Cuba. Although the funds in payment of the
draft reached a Cuban bank (Banco), they were transmitted to neither the
defendant nor the plaintiff for lack of a permit from the Currency Stabiliza-
tion Fund in Cuba. The defendant promptly notified the plaintiff of this
impasse. The Cuban nationalization in 1960, which embraced both Banco
and Cuban Electric Corp., rendered the collection from Banco virtually im-
possible. A month later the defendant received instructions from a depositor
to credit Banco's account with $38,600. The defendant complied and then
on its own initiative charged the Banco account with the $38,600 to offset
the Cuban Electric Corporation's debt. It reasoned that Banco and the Cuban
Electric Corp. were a single entity (Cuba) as a result of the nationalization.
The plaintiff commenced this suit, alleging that the defendant, as plaintiff's
collection agent, was obligated either to apply Banco's credit to its draft or
to give notice of the credit so that it might act for itself. Plaintiff concluded
that failure to do so made the defendant liable for the amount of the draft.
The lower court agreed.
The court of appeals reversed, holding first that the propriety of de-
fendant's appropriation of Banco's credit was irrelevant to the case and sec-
ondly, that the defendant had performed its statutory duties under both
Section 5 of the Banking Collection Code (N.Y. Negotiable Instruments Law,
Section 350-d) and Section 4-202 of the Code. It concluded that since the
defendant had fulfilled its statutory requirements, under Section 4-202(3) of
the Code it was not liable for Banco's default. The court then determined
that the law levied no extra-statutory duties upon the defendant and that
since it had received the new Banco credit in good faith, it was free to apply
this credit for its own benefit without notifying the plaintiff.
COMMENT
The transactions which gave rise to this litigation all occurred prior to
the date upon which the Code became effective in New York. See N.Y. Corn-
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